Thursday, October 2, 2008

Sept 16 and 17

From today's New York Times, the truth:

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new_york_times:http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/02/business/02crisis.html

By JOE NOCERA
Published: October 1, 2008
This article was reported by Andrew Ross Sorkin, Diana B. Henriques, Edmund L. Andrews and Joe Nocera. It was written by Mr. Nocera.


Lehman Brothers’ headquarters on Seventh Avenue in New York on Sept. 15, the day the parent company filed for bankruptcy protection.
“Panic can cause a prudent person to do rational things that can contribute to the failure of an institution.” — William A. Ackman of the hedge fund Pershing Square Capital Management.

It was early on Wednesday, Sept. 17, when executives at Pershing Square, Bill Ackman’s hedge fund, began getting nervous calls and e-mail messages from investors. Mr. Ackman, 42, has been a top Wall Street player for 15 years, making his clients — and himself — billions of dollars.
But now, Mr. Ackman and his colleagues were taken aback by what they were hearing. His big investors were worried about all of the Pershing assets held by Goldman Sachs, the blue-chip investment bank, whose stock had come under siege.
Never mind that Goldman kept Pershing’s assets in a segregated account, and that the money was safe. And never mind that Mr. Ackman believed Goldman was the world’s best-run investment bank and would come through the credit crisis unscathed.
Pershing investors still feared their money might be exposed. Mr. Ackman advised Goldman executives to do something to restore confidence — such as getting an infusion of capital from Warren E. Buffett, the billionaire investor. And while Mr. Ackman kept his assets at Goldman, he hurriedly set up accounts at three other institutions — just in case things got much worse.
Pershing had more faith than most. Up and down Wall Street, hedge funds with billions of dollars at Goldman and Morgan Stanley, another storied investment bank, were frantically pulling money out and looking for safer havens.
Panic was spreading on two of the scariest days ever in financial markets, and the biggest investors — not small investors — were panicking the most. Nobody was sure how much damage it would cause before it ended.
This is what a credit crisis looks like. It’s not like a stock market crisis, where the scary plunge of stocks is obvious to all. The credit crisis has played out in places most people can’t see. It’s banks refusing to lend to other banks — even though that is one of the most essential functions of the banking system. It’s a loss of confidence in seemingly healthy institutions like Morgan Stanley and Goldman — both of which reported profits even as the pressure was mounting. It is panicked hedge funds pulling out cash. It is frightened investors protecting themselves by buying credit-default swaps — a financial insurance policy against potential bankruptcy — at prices 30 times what they normally would pay.
It was this 36-hour period two weeks ago — from the morning of Wednesday, Sept. 17, to the afternoon of Thursday, Sept. 18 — that spooked policy makers by opening fissures in the worldwide financial system.
In their rush to do something, and do it fast, the Federal Reserve chairman, Ben S. Bernanke, and Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. concluded the time had come to use the “break the glass” rescue plan they had been developing. But in their urgency, they bypassed a crucial step in Washington and fashioned their $700 billion bailout without political spadework, which led to a resounding rejection this past Monday in the House of Representatives.
That Thursday evening, however, time was of the essence. In a hastily convened meeting in the conference room of the House speaker, Nancy Pelosi, the two men presented, in the starkest terms imaginable, the outline of the $700 billion plan to Congressional leaders. “If we don’t do this,” Mr. Bernanke said, according to several participants, “we may not have an economy on Monday.”
Setting the Stage
Wall Street executives and federal officials had known since the previous weekend that it was likely to be a difficult week.
With the government refusing to offer the same financial guarantees that helped save Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, efforts on Saturday to find a buyer for Lehman Brothers had failed.
Sunday was spent preparing to deal with Lehman’s bankruptcy, which was announced Monday morning. Merrill Lynch, fearing it would be next, had agreed to be bought by Bank of America. The American International Group was near collapse. (It would be rescued with an $85 billion loan from the Federal Reserve on Tuesday evening.)
With government policy makers appearing to careen from crisis to crisis, the Dow Jones industrial average plunged 504 points on Monday, Sept. 15. Panic was in the air.
At those weekend meetings, Wall Street executives and federal officials talked about the possibility of contagion — that the Lehman bankruptcy might set off so much fear among investors that the market “would pivot to the next weakest firm in the herd,” as one federal official put it.
That firm, everyone knew, was likely to be Morgan Stanley, whose stock had been dropping since the previous Monday, Sept. 8. Within three hours on Tuesday, Sept. 16, Morgan Stanley shares fell another 28 percent, and the rising cost of its credit-default swaps suggested investors were predicting bankruptcy.
To allay the panic, the firm decided to report earnings a day early — after the market closed Tuesday afternoon instead of Wednesday morning. The profit was terrific — $1.425 billion, just a 3 percent decline from 2007 — and the thinking was that would give investors the night to absorb the good news.
“I am hoping that this will generally help calm the market,” Morgan Stanley’s chief financial officer, Colm A. Kelleher, said in an interview late that afternoon. “These markets are behaving irrationally. There’s a lot of fear.”
The Spreading Contagion
But contagion was already spreading. The problem posed by the Lehman bankruptcy was not the losses suffered by hedge funds and other investors who traded stocks or bonds with the firms. As federal officials had predicted, that turned out to be manageable. (That was one reason the government did not step in to save the firm.)
The real problem was that a handful of hedge funds that used the firm’s London office to handle their trades had billions of dollars in balances frozen in the bankruptcy.
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Additional reporting was by Jenny Anderson, Nelson D. Schwartz, Eric Dash, Louise Story, Michael M. Grynbaum, Carter Dougherty and Vikas Bajaj.



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