Duke Energy -- For Upcoming Winter -- Laurel Bill For November

Duke Energy Ohio Apples to Apples Chart
Updated, November 28, 2007 -- Next update, December 5, 2007
Duke Energy Ohio's Rate
Duke Energy Ohio's current total rate is $1.2053 per hundred cubic feet (Ccf), effective from November 29, 2007 to January 1, 2008. This includes a Gas Cost Recovery (GCR) rate of $0.9283 per Ccf, a gross receipts tax of $0.0454 per Ccf, and transportation costs of $0.2316 per Ccf. Duke Energy Ohio's GCR rate varies each month and provides a dollar-for-dollar recovery of costs incurred by the local utility to purchase natural gas. The GCR rate allows the local utility to correct any over or under collections of natural gas costs from previous periods if the actual cost is different than the estimate. Contact information for Duke Energy Ohio: 139 East Fourth St., Cincinnati, OH 45201, (800) 544-6900, www.duke-energy.com.

Oral Argument @ Sixth Circuit

Living in Cincinnati, on Wednesday I surveilled the Sixth Circuit playing field, the wolfs’ lair, the cathedral, entrance to hell, depending on your point of view; and key judges, a day earlier.

For you out-of-towners, and even long-time denizens, take a compass or a Garmin! The federal building sits east-west, with a long, long hall in the middle of the building with no windows showing Fifth Street pigeons and the facing Federal Reserve Building, on most floors, including six, between the two courtrooms on six. “Am I going east or west? Now let’s see, I came in on Walnut Street, ….” “East is Mt. Adams, right?” “West is Fountain Square.”

Keep your parking ticket (underground garage on Fountain Square) because if you pay cash it must be done on Fountain Square before you get your car later.

And of course put all change, metallic objects, etc. in Gucci bag for scanning, and have at least your driver’s license handy for flashing.

The day of your oral argument you have to first check in at the clerk’s office on floor five, and for security reasons can only get to that office by the east elevator, not the west one. It opens at 8 am.

I sat in on oral arguments in Sixth West where Judge McKeague, the most-recent [GWB] appointee, of Lansing, was sitting with Sutton (Columbus) and xxx. Then I checked in at the Sixth Circuit Law Library on three for some quiet time.

“Do you know who will be [November 29th] the Chairman of my panel of Siler, [London, Ky.] Gibbons & Mckeague?”

[looking at her computer] “Gibbons [Memphis]. Do you want to know who wrote the opinion?”

That takes the pressure off! If the opinion's been written the oral argument is window-dressing! A little time to focus and maybe show off with a tap dance or magic trick or two. Maybe that joke that Jack Murray told me about the “French-post” and the doctor. Or opine on the fate of Michigan football coaching [for McKeague].

But in any event show the strongest exhibit, etc. Certainly, in the 15 minutes allowed for each side, not time for much more anyway.

Draw them into revealing themselves! That’s the ticket. Maybe stammer like [Treasury’s/Harvard’s] Larry Summers and then, once on the talking track keep-talking-like-he-does-without-allowing-anyone-to-talk-until-the-three-paragraph dissertation (quick breath) is-completed. The judge wanting to ask a question will be so exasperated that in asking his/her question he/she will blurt revealing, telling emotion as well.

On this “day-before” oral arguments I was pleased with Judge McKeague’s questions. No ivory-tower guy. He will be fair and seeks to learn on any topic; he might even be attracted to the very interesting inferential aspects of my case. It’s a cathedral after all!

Larry Summers in The Financial Times

This article in yesterday's Financial Times is pretty persuasive, if turgid.


Wake up to the dangers of a deepening crisis
By Lawrence Summers
Published: November 26 2007 02:00 Last updated: November 26 2007 02:00
Three months ago it was reasonable to expect that the subprime credit crisis would be a financially significant event but not one that would threaten the overall pattern of economic growth. This is still a possible outcome but no longer the preponderant probability.
Even if necessary changes in policy are implemented, the odds now favour a US recession that slows growth significantly on a global basis. Without stronger policy responses than have been observed to date, moreover, there is the risk that the adverse impacts will be felt for the rest of this decade and beyond.
Several streams of data indicate how much more serious the situation is than was clear a few months ago. First, forward-looking indicators suggest that the housing sector may be in free-fall from what felt like the basement levels of a few months ago. Single family home construction may be down over the next year by as much as half from previous peak levels. There are forecasts implied by at least one property derivatives market indicating that nationwide house prices could fall from their previous peaks by as much as 25 per cent over the next several years.
We do not have comparable experiences on which to base predictions about what this will mean for the overall economy, but it is hard to believe declines of anything like this magnitude will not lead to a dramatic slowing in the consumer spending that has driven the economy in recent years.
Second, it is now clear that only a small part of the financial distress that must be worked through has yet been faced. On even the most optimistic estimates, the rate of foreclosure will more than double over the next year as rates reset on subprime mortgages and home values fall. Estimates vary, but there is nearly universal agreement that - if all assets were marked to market valuations - total losses in the US financial sector would be several times the $50bn (£24.3bn) or so in write-downs that have already been announced by big financial institutions. These figures take no account of the likelihood that losses will spread to the credit card, auto and commercial property sectors. Nor do they recognise the large volume of financial instruments that depend for their high ratings on guarantees provided by credit insurers whose own health is now very much in doubt.
Third, the capacity of the financial system to provide credit in support of new investment on the scale necessary to maintain economic expansion is in increasing doubt. The extent of the flight to quality and its expected persistence was powerfully demonstrated last week when the yield on the two-year Treasury bond dropped below 3 per cent for the first time in years. Banks and other financial intermediaries will inevitably curtail new lending as they are hit by a perfect storm of declining capital due to mark-to-market losses, involuntary balance sheet expansion as various backstop facilities are called, and greatly reduced confidence in the creditworthiness of traditional borrowers as the economy turns downwards and asset prices fall.
Then there are the potentially adverse effects on confidence of a sharply falling dollar, rising energy costs, geopolitical uncertainties especially in the Middle East, or lower global growth as economic slowdown and a falling dollar cause the US no longer to fulfil its traditional role of importer of last resort.
In such an environment, economic policy needs to be governed by the clear and public recognition that restoring the normal functioning of the financial system and containing any damage its breakdown may do the real economy is the central macro-economic and financial challenge facing the US. In the US today, as in many other countries in the past, confidence will return the first day an official statement about the economy proves to have been too pessimistic.
What concrete steps are necessary? First, maintaining demand must be the over-arching macro-economic priority. That means the Fed has to get ahead of the curve and recognise - as the market already has - that levels of the Fed Funds rate that were neutral when the financial system was working normally are quite contractionary today. As important as long-run deficit reduction is, fiscal policy needs to be on stand-by to provide immediate temporary stimulus through spending or tax benefits for low- and middle-income families if the situation worsens.
Second, policymakers need to articulate a clear strategy addressing the various pressures leading to contractions in credit. Very likely this will involve measures that are non-traditional, given how much of the problem lies outside bank balance sheets. The time for worrying about imprudent lending is past. The priority now has to be maintaining the flow of credit. The current main policy thrust - the so-called "super conduit", in which banks co-operate to take on the assets of troubled investment vehicles - has never been publicly explained in any detail by the US Treasury. On the information available, the "super conduit" has worrying similarities with Japanese banking practices of the 1990s that aroused criticism from American authorities for their lack of transparency, suppression of genuine market pricing of bad credits, and inhibiting effect on new lending. Perhaps there is a strong case for it, but that case has yet to be made.
Third, there needs to be a comprehensive approach taken to maintaining demand in the housing market to the maximum extent possible. The government operating through the Federal Housing Administration, through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or through some kind of direct lending, needs to assure that there is a continuing flow of reasonably priced loans to credit worthy home purchasers. At the same time there need to be templates established for the restructuring of mortgages to homeowners who cannot afford their resets, so every case does not have to be managed individually.
All of this may not be enough to avert a recession. But it is much more than is under way right now. The writer is the Charles W. Eliot professor at Harvard University
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2007

Zero Heating Degree Day Today!

or almost, in Cincinnati. High of 68, low of 56.

Click on Label "November" to see the norm.

Hunter S. Thompson

A book review is relevant to our erlier blogs dealing with his incredible story involving Justice Clarence Thomas:

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/books/review/Klein-t.html?_r=1&oref=login

Boyko Followed by Judge Rose

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/17/business/17lend.html#

Two Ohio State-Michigan Parties

Every year in Glendale Dick Keys (and Rodger Brown and Allan Dohan) host a big Ohio State-Michigan party:

Two -- or was it three -- years ago Dick says to me: You, are you a Nancy Pelosi fan? Do you think we are safer after invading Iraq than before?

Frankly, my response was "Who is Nancy Pelosi?" and "No."

Saturday nobody asked me those questions. My answers would have been:

"No" and "No."

Good Writing, Good Daily Happiness

I have gotten into the discipline of never turning on my car radio. Why live someone else's life? Why listen to the addictive Talk Radio?

It occurs to me that a Blog allows one to focus only on the best of what one likes. One's own Blog.

By clicking on my own tailored "Labels" I can go to the best of what I've saved.

TIVO allows the best as well.

There Are Normally 4785 Heating Degree Days a Year

So, divide by three and that's your projected annualized cost of heating your home:

4785/3 = $1,595

(Don't ask why, but it is all spelled out below under "Heating Degree Days."

It's a Seven ccf Day Today, November 19, or Should Be

Average Normal Temperature on November 19 = 44 (Fernbank, Cincinnati)
Average Heating Degree Days for November 19 = 21 (65-44)
Average ccf for 3000 sq. ft, house November 19 = 7 (21/3 -- don't ask me why)
Average cost for 7 ccf for November 19 = $7 (1 ccf costs $1.00 to the end-user residential)

Cost Per Megawatt Just Tripled

I am updating my June 16, 2007 blog. Based on recent testimony before the Ohio Publis Utilities Commission, the cost per megawatt for a coal-fired plant is $2.6 Billion, not the easy-to-remember $1 Billion.

GE Money England Blog on First-Time Home Buyers' Change in Attitude

I am repeating my blog from August 10, as it shows dramatically the declining interest in the young (in England at least) in home ownership and the increasing interest in just hanging out with one's friends.

http://blogs.theage.com.au/managementline/GE%20Money%20-%20Life%20of%20Mars.pdf

How to Read This Blog

For the truest items on natural gas, click on the label "Heating Degree Days" and topics that sound related. A full list of labels is shown if you scroll down completely (I want them on the right side but have temporarily forgotten how to do this).

For attorney-related matters, click accordingly, although all topics have a sprinkling of legal-speak, as that is who I am.

The rest will be Hot Air to many.

This NY Times Arfticle Today is a Dryer Rant Like Cramer's Seen Below

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/business/18deal.html

A Must-Read Blog

Another reflection on the arrogant:

http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/11/14/what-has-become-of-the-iraqitects/index.html

Recently I was on a long flight with one of the Bush Administration’s key architects of the Iraq War who had just left public service to explore “challenging new horizons in the private sector.” Perhaps it is more accurate to describe this fellow as more of a general contractor than architect, given his perch at the Pentagon and deep engagement in the early conduct of the war.
Anyway, much to my surprise, he watched the movie (a rollicking “Transformers,” with giant militant robots that would have undoubtedly come in handy in the battle for Falluja), browsed the duty free and tried to cut the steak meal with the plastic knife, just like the rest of the passengers on board. I don’t know what I was expecting, but it was certainly not this

Judge Boyko Clip

Plaintiff's, "Judge, you just don't understand how things work," argument reveals a condescending mindset and quasi-monopolistic system where financial institutions have traditionally controlled, and still control, the foreclosure process. Typically, the homeowner who finds himself/herself in financial straits, fails to make the required mortgage payments and faces a foreclosure suit, is not interested in testing state or federal jurisdictional requirements, either pro se or through counsel. Their focus is either, "how do I save my home," or "if I have to give it up, I'll simply leave and find somewhere else to live."In the meantime, the financial institutions or successors/assignees rush to foreclose, obtain a default judgment and then sit on the deed, avoiding responsibility for maintaining the property while reaping the financial benefits of interest running on a judgment. The financial institutions know the law charges the one with title (still the homeowner) with maintaining the property.There is no doubt every decision made by a financial institution in the foreclosure process is driven by money. And the [*9] legal work which flows from winning the financial institution's favor is highly lucrative. There is nothing improper or wrong with financial institutions or law firms making a profit -- to the contrary , they should be rewarded for sound business and legal practices. However, unchallenged by underfinanced opponents, the institutions worry less about jurisdictional requirements and more about maximizing returns.

Cramer Tonight

The infallibility of the "geniuses" -- the really, really smart, on Wall Street.

This segment of Mad Money pokes at the lack of transparancy of the Private Equity funds which have no accounting transparancy. "Private Equity" is important because it assembles money and is secret because there are no reporting requirements (until they go public, as Blackstone has). What follows is Cramer's words:

They are all superhuman geniuses with flatulence that smells like rose petals. Too smart to do anything stupid. Blackstone and Fortress Group (FIG). The Smartest Private Equity Guys in the World. Only Kryptonite can defeat them. Even though they make billions more than you or I...



Billions more than the whole country of China in 2006. Without (much) tax.


Fortress ceo is a "particularly nice guy." Would rather have a beer with him than own his stock. How do you put a value on this? (Genius you'd like to have a beer with)

The test: How close could I stand next to genius [Steve Schwartzman] at a party?

Shwartzman is too smart to lose money.

Cerberus ( a Private Equity fund that may go public soon): who wants to own Chrysler?

When Hercules dragged Cerberus up the mountain to do odd jobs, Hercules jumped into a pot to escape being in the presence of Cerberus. [Just like Mike with the loud voice who left the house after 7 days of insulating in the attic and then morphing into the family elephant-in-the room doing other odd jobs!]

Cramer: If Cerberus were public I would sell it. When Cerberus comes calling you jump into a pot if it ever comes calling.

Incidentally, Cramer mentioned "a 63-year old" man, referring to himself. Happy Birthday Jim. But are you 52 or 62?

Cramer Tonight -- Just Brilliant

Mike has just left. More on him later.
I am listening and TIVOing the last segment of Cramer's Mad Money. Brilliant. Just the way I feel about private equity, the "brightest guys in the room" who have screwed all those who invested in them recently. If it weren't for having to go to dinner, I'd say more now.

More Judge Boyko

The Court's Amended General Order No. 2006-16 requires Plaintiff to submit an affidavit along with the Complaint, which identifies Plaintiff either as the original mortgage holder, or as an assignee, trustee or successor-in-interest. Once again, the affidavits submitted in all these cases recite the averment that Plaintiff is the owner of the Note and Mortgage, without any mention of an assignment or trust or successor interest. Consequently, the very filings and submissions of the Plaintiff create a conflict. In every instance, then, Plaintiff has not satisfied its burden of demonstrating standing at the time of the filing of the Complaint.
Understandably, [*4] the Court requested clarification by requiring each Plaintiff to submit a copy of the Assignment of the Note and Mortgage, executed as of the date of the Foreclosure Complaint. In the above-captioned cases, none of the Assignments show the named Plaintiff to be the owner of the rights, title and interest under the Mortgage at issue as of the date of the Foreclosure Complaint. The Assignments, in every instance, express a present intent to convey all rights, title and interest in the Mortgage and the accompanying Note to the Plaintiff named in the caption of the Foreclosure Complaint upon receipt of sufficient consideration on the date the Assignment was signed and notarized. Further, the Assignment documents are all prepared by counsel for the named Plaintiffs. These proffered documents belie Plaintiffs' assertion they own the Note and Mortgage by means of a purchase which pre-dated the Complaint by days, months or years.
Plaintiff-Lenders shall take note, furthermore, that prior to the issuance of its October 10, 2007 Order, the Court considered the principles of "real party in interest," and examined Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 -- "Parties Plaintiff and Defendant; Capacity" and its associated [*5] Commentary. The Rule is not apropos to the situation raised by these Foreclosure Complaints. The Rule's Commentary offers this explanation: "The provision should not be misunderstood or distorted. It is intended to prevent forfeiture when determination of the proper party to sue is difficult or when an understandable mistake has been made. ... It is, in cases of this sort, intended to insure against forfeiture and injustice ..." Plaintiff-Lenders do not allege mistake or that a party cannot be identified. Nor will Plaintiff-Lenders suffer forfeiture or injustice by the dismissal of these defective complaints otherwise than on the merits.
Moreover, this Court is obligated to carefully scrutinize all filings and pleadings in foreclosure actions, since the unique nature of real property requires contracts and transactions concerning real property to be in writing. R.C. § 1335.04. Ohio law holds that when a mortgage is assigned, moreover, the assignment is subject to the recording requirements of R.C. § 5301.25. Creager v. Anderson (1934), 16 Ohio Law Abs. 400 (interpreting the former statute, G.C. § 8543). "Thus, with regards to real property, before an entity assigned an interest in that [*6] property would be entitled to receive a distribution from the sale of the property, their interest therein must have been recorded in accordance with Ohio law." In re Ochmanek, 266 B.R. 114, 120 (Bkrtcy.N.D. Ohio 2000) (citing Pinney v. Merchants' National Bank of Defiance, 71 Ohio St. 173, 177 (1904). 1

1 Astoundingly, counsel at oral argument stated that his client, the purchaser from the original mortgagee, acquired complete legal and equitable interest in land when money changed hands, even before the purchase agreement, let alone a proper assignment, made its way into his client's possession.
This Court acknowledges the right of banks, holding valid mortgages, to receive timely payments. And, if they do not receive timely payments, banks have the right to properly file actions on the defaulted notes -- seeking foreclosure on the property securing the notes. Yet, this Court possesses the independent obligations to preserve the judicial integrity of the federal court and to jealously guard federal jurisdiction. Neither the fluidity of the secondary mortgage market, nor monetary or economic considerations of the parties, nor the convenience of the litigants supersede those obligations.
Despite [*7] Plaintiffs' counsel's belief that "there appears to be some level of disagreement and/or misunderstanding amongst professionals, borrowers, attorneys and members of the judiciary," the Court does not require instruction and is not operating under any misapprehension.

The Effect of Judge Boyko's Opinion

Truthfully, Deutsche Bank can now simply file in state court. The dismissal was without prejudice. Most foreclosures are in state court. Still, the question becomes, can Deutsch Bank prove it holds the mortgage?

Boy-oh-Boyko; Here are Some Jewels From the Opinion re Deutsche Bank

Astoundingly, counsel at oral argument stated that his client, the purchaser from the original mortgagee, acquired complete legal and equitable interest in land when money changed hands, even before the purchase agreement, let alone a proper assignment, made its way into his client's possession.This Court acknowledges the right of banks, holding valid mortgages, to receive timely payments. And, if they do not receive timely payments, banks have the right to properly file actions on the defaulted notes -- seeking foreclosure on the property securing the notes. Yet, this Court possesses the independent obligations to preserve the judicial integrity of the federal court and to jealously guard federal jurisdiction. Neither the fluidity of the secondary mortgage market, nor monetary or economic considerations of the parties, nor the convenience of the litigants supersede those obligations.Despite [*7] Plaintiffs' counsel's belief that "there appears to be some level of disagreement and/or misunderstanding amongst professionals, borrowers, attorneys and members of the judiciary," the Court does not require instruction and is not operating under any misapprehension. The "real party in interest" rule, to which the Plaintiff-Lenders continually refer in their responses or motions, is clearly comprehended by the Court and is not intended to assist banks in avoiding traditional federal diversity requirements. n2 Unlike Ohio State law and procedure, as Plaintiffs perceive it, the federal judicial system need not, and will not, be "forgiving in this regard." n3 In re Foreclosure Cases, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84011, 6-7 (D. Ohio 2007)


n3 Plaintiff's, "Judge, you just don't understand how things work," argument reveals a condescending mindset and quasi-monopolistic system where financial institutions have traditionally controlled, and still control, the foreclosure process. Typically, the homeowner who finds himself/herself in financial straits, fails to make the required mortgage payments and faces a foreclosure suit, is not interested in testing state or federal jurisdictional requirements, either pro se or through counsel. Their focus is either, "how do I save my home," or "if I have to give it up, I'll simply leave and find somewhere else to live."In the meantime, the financial institutions or successors/assignees rush to foreclose, obtain a default judgment and then sit on the deed, avoiding responsibility for maintaining the property while reaping the financial benefits of interest running on a judgment. The financial institutions know the law charges the one with title (still the homeowner) with maintaining the property.There is no doubt every decision made by a financial institution in the foreclosure process is driven by money. And the [*9] legal work which flows from winning the financial institution's favor is highly lucrative. There is nothing improper or wrong with financial institutions or law firms making a profit -- to the contrary , they should be rewarded for sound business and legal practices. However, unchallenged by underfinanced opponents, the institutions worry less about jurisdictional requirements and more about maximizing returns. Unlike the focus of financial institutions, the federal courts must act as gatekeepers, assuring that only those who meet diversity and standing requirements are allowed to pass through. Counsel for the institutions are not without legal argument to support their position, but their arguments fall woefully short of justifying their premature filings, and utterly fail to satisfy their standing and jurisdictional burdens. The institutions seem to adopt the attitude that since they have been doing this for so long, unchallenged, this practice equates with legal compliance. Finally put to the test, their weak legal arguments compel the Court to stop them at the gate.The Court will illustrate in simple terms its decision: "Fluidity of the market" -- "X" dollars, "contractual arrangements [*10] between institutions and counsel" -- "X" dollars, "purchasing mortgages in bulk and securitizing" -- "X" dollars, "rush to file, slow to record after judgment" -- "X" dollars, "the jurisdictional integrity of United States District Court" -- "Priceless."In re Foreclosure Cases, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84011, 9-10 (D. Ohio 2007)

Federal Judge Boyko in Northern Ohio Stops Sub-primes

This will be something to read. The court's opinion, I mean. Deutsch Bank did not, could not, prove that it owned the mortgages! A glitch of securitization???

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/15/business/15lend.html?em&ex=1195275600&en=0d0afe9e3bba44aa&ei=5087%0A

See if This Works

http://feeds.wsjonline.com/wsj/energy/feed

Friedman Today on Wealth Transfers Involving Oil

Tom Friedman comes at the energy situation from another angle, but his core point, that we are transferring our wealth to the Middle East by the near-$100/bbl oil prices, and that a gasoline tax would be a win-win-win-win situation.

More importantly, he focuses on the idiotic arguments made by the You Know Whos regarding ANY taxation.

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/14/opinion/14friedman.html?hp

Sept 4 2007 NYT Article on Deregulation of Electricity

I was travelling the day this article came out.

I am linking this topic with my label "Judge Cudahy" because he was the first to stand up and write about the coming fraud/tragedy of electric deregulation, as I point out in my earlier blogs.

This is a theme I have spent a lot of time on on this blog. Assuming the NYT reporters are knowledgable, the reporters do not call a spade a spade, due to influence from the likes of the Cato Institute, which is quoted, as though it knows anything other than dogma. Sam Randazzo, representing northern Ohio industrial consumers, and John Anderson of ELCON, also quoted, were the ones who planted the seed for electric deregulation, which, by definition gives this most important segment of our society over to monopolies.

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/04/business/04energy.html?pagewanted=1&fta=y

Cramer Yesterday

An excellent session on Mad Money about how broker recommendations are done, and in the case at hand, were both wrong (one a buy, by Merrill Lynch, and one a sell, by Bear Stearns) on the same pharma stock (I forget which). Both missed the point, Cramer points out, although he agrees that pharmas are a buy now because he feels the fed has screwed up by not doing more now to lower interest rates and we are now heading for a recession. And pharmas are excellent stocks to own going into a recession.

Cramer's New York Magazine Article on Citi and Goldman Sachs and Merrill

I post the following mainly because it was referred to in another blog I came across.

As usual, however, Cramer makes excellent points.

In this article Cramer makes Wall Street what it is -- run by individual people who have the power because of some historic fluke but then move on to make huge mistakes that are not discovered until the historic blow-up, in this case, in subprime securities. So, Cramer, because he KNOWS the neighborhood, can make Wall Street to be just like your neighborhood where you know the players.

Merrill Lynch slung around all that money in the wrong direction because O'Neal said so.

And in the compartmentalization of Merrill nobody knew what stupid risks were being taken by O'Neal, as each department was focusing on its own job, such as gathering money, or schmoozing clients, etc.


http://nymag.com/news/businessfinance/bottomline/40639/

Key Point of Toobin New Yorker Article

[I post Toobin's review because, as evidenced below, I am fascinated with Justice Thomas. Why? Various reasons. I am an attorney working in the discrimination field representing plaintiffs. Also, more importantly, perhaps, I became fascinated by a Rolling Stone article so slanderous of Justice Thomas, that I researched the law of libel. COULD Justice Thomas have slammed that cadillac filled whith whores into those sheep on that rainy night in Utah?]

Now, more Toobin:

"In other words, Yale and Reagan treated him the same way, but he hates one and reveres the other. Thomas never acknowledges, much less explains, the contradiction."

More Toobin on Clarence Thomas

For almost eight years, Thomas seems to have done a competent job running the E.E.O.C. Reagan’s people had, in a model demonstration of affirmative action, looked beyond the traditional candidates for leadership positions, and taken a chance on Thomas, and he had done as well as any white executive could have been expected to do. But, as Thomas moved through the hierarchy of Republican Administrations, the paternalism didn’t seem to bother him anymore—or else he found it convenient to pretend that it did not exist. Thomas’s rhetoric against traditional civil-rights dogma became more strident, even as he became an ever more prominent beneficiary of it. In other words, Yale and Reagan treated him the same way, but he hates one and reveres the other. Thomas never acknowledges, much less explains, the contradiction.

More Toobin on Clarence Thomas

From same New Yorker article:



This omission becomes even more glaring when Thomas begins to discuss his judicial career. In 1989, he was hardly an obvious candidate for the court of appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which is generally regarded as second in importance only to the Supreme Court. Just forty-one years old, Thomas had never tried a case, or argued an appeal, in any federal court, much less in the high-powered D.C. Circuit; the last time Thomas had appeared in any courtroom was when he was a junior attorney in Missouri; he had never produced any scholarly work; his tenure at the E.E.O.C., although respectable, did not mark him as a notable innovator in the federal bureaucracy. He was, in short, a black conservative in an Administration with very few of them. That’s why he got the job.

New Yorker Article on Unfairness of Hedge Fund Fee Structure

I post this article because it highlights how the huge fee on Wall Street always trumps the long-term good of the customer. How many of us could resist the one-time $100 million bonanza into our checking account that awaits the "risk-taking" hedge fund manager? If the bets go south the fund goes out of existence. But in the meantime you are sipping drinks in St Johns with $100 million from the year before's favorable result. And you are not a criminal either.


http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2007/11/12/071112ta_talk_surowiecki

Clarence Thomas -- Book Review by Jeffrey Toobin

http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/books/2007/11/12/071112crbo_books_toobin




And that’s also why, in 1991, after Thomas had been a judge for just sixteen months, Bush named him to replace Thurgood Marshall on the Supreme Court. At a press conference in Kennebunkport, when the President introduced Thomas to the nation, Bush said that the young judge was “the best qualified” nominee for the Court—a self-evidently preposterous statement. Indeed, in his book Thomas says, “Even I had my doubts about so extravagant a claim,” so he took it upon himself to ask C. Boyden Gray, Bush’s White House counsel, if he had been picked because he was black. According to Thomas, “Boyden replied that in fact my race had actually worked against me.” Gray said that Bush had originally planned to have Thomas replace Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., but Brennan had quit earlier than expected, in 1990, and Thomas was not yet regarded as ready for the promotion. As Thomas recalls the conversation with Gray, he said that the Bush Administration wanted “to avoid appointing me to what was widely perceived as the court’s ‘black’ seat.” But, of course, that is precisely what Bush did, and it is inconceivable that a young white lawyer who headed a modest federal agency would have been similarly rushed onto the Supreme Court. In the light of this conversation with Gray, though, Thomas declares that his race worked against him as a potential judicial appointee. It is hard to tell whether this is self-delusion or dishonesty.

Gasparino

Gasparino is moving up on my all star list. Every time he appears on CNBC I trust him.

Yesterday there was a four-way discussion of the sub-prime mess and he put himself into the mind of the borrower. Maria Bartaromo did too. So too did the others.

They are all missing a big, big point which is shown in my prior blogs. Search "Countrywide."

If you want a quicker answer, email me.

Who Was That?

After putting her grandchildren to bed, a grandmother changed into old slacks and a droopy blouse and proceeded to wash her hair. As she heard the children getting more and more rambunctious, her patience grew thin. Finally, she threw a towel around her head and stormed into their room, putting them back to bed with stern warnings. As she left the room,she heard the three-year-old say with a trembling voice, "Who was THAT?"

Immelt on Charlie Rose Last Night

Immelt is of interest to me because the dirty little secret of the great bull market of the 1980's and 1990's was simply to overweight in GE stock.
Since the early 2000 or so GE stock has done nothing. My belief, from seeing GE traders at an accounting conference on derivatives in Connecticut in the late 1990's, was that GE was another Enron (in its GE Capital division, now called GE Money) waiting to happen. In my belief GE has been "working off" those hidden liabilities over the past four or five years. All of this is hidden, of course, because the complexity of GE Money's transactions defies description in the annual report or proxy statements.


Now back to Immelt and Charlie Rose:

My first "take" -- I was 1/2 asleep when watching it on TIVO at 3 am:

He's somewhat vague. When asked about whether GE benefitted from its global business and the falling dollar, he said "As a company we are perfectly hedged."

What does that mean? When you think about it that answer could have the opposite meaning of "benefiting" from having so much global.

Close your eyes and he sounds exactly like Tom Friedman.

He's a Cincinnati boy, the son of a GE'r.

GE is so important that I will probably watch this hour again to study what he said.

Saving Energy

http://www.city-data.com/forum/house/190066-ideas-saving-energy.html

This cite looks quite promising.

See My Sept 2 2007 Blog re NYT Article Likening Sub-Prime Arena to Casino

Click on Title "Liar's Poker by Michael Lewis"


As mortgage bankers discovered that investors would buy virtually any loan whatsoever, they naturally lowered their standards. What difference whether a loan was sound if you could flip it in 48 hours? The market thus corrupted, it only wanted for the right circumstances to implode. And over the last few years, as Robert Barbera, the chief economist at the investment advisory firm ITG, observed, the Federal Reserve took short-term interest rates from 1 percent to 5 1/4 percent. This raised mortgage rates and put home buyers at risk of being priced out of the market. But bankers lent to them anyway, offering, in effect, “junk mortgages” — risky loans with low teaser rates (and much higher rates later), as well as other deviations from sound finance. Lenders and borrowers alike knew that such loans were dicey; they were counting on the borrowers to refinance — which, as long as home prices kept rising, was a cinch. Naturally, when prices stopped rising, the music stopped.
What happened over the last generation is that housing was turned from a market that responded to consumers to one largely driven by investors. Liberal mortgage financing pushed home prices higher — and younger, first-time buyers were effectively priced out of the market. Rates of homeownership are scarcely any higher than in the mid-1960s.

NYT Book Review on Liar's Poker -- 1989

October 29, 1989
BOOK & BUSINESS; OVERPAID AND GUILT-RIDDEN
By RICHARD L. STERN; RICHARD L. STERN IS A SENIOR EDITOR AT FORBES MAGAZINE.
LEAD: LIAR'S POKER Rising Through the Wreckage on Wall Street. By Michael Lewis. 249 pp. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. $18.95.
LIAR'S POKER Rising Through the Wreckage on Wall Street. By Michael Lewis. 249 pp. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. $18.95.
In 1984, through an improbable set of circumstances, Michael Lewis, a 24-year-old Princeton University graduate studying at the London School of Economics, turned up in a rented tuxedo at a dinner given by the Queen Mother. He found himself seated next to the wife of a managing partner of Salomon Brothers. Mr. Lewis soon landed a job with the company - one of the most sought-after opportunities for the money-minded college generation of the 1980's.
''Liar's Poker'' is the very funny account of his three-year, dog-eat-dog climb there. Starting as an overpaid $48,000-a-year trainee, Mr. Lewis, by 1987, was on his way to triumph as an institutional bond salesman in Salomon's London office, earning $225,000.
This is a story with much irony. Here is one of America's top investment banking and securities trading firms, an adviser to the largest corporations and money managers, unable to run itself. Its management style is one of warring individuals and factions. While its chairman, John Gutfreund, moaned about underlings demanding too much money, he turned out to be the highest-paid chief executive on Wall Street. The message from the top down was contagious: Every man for himself.
In London, a naive Mr. Lewis was talked into selling some bonds from Salomon's inventory by a trader who had to get rid of them or face a loss. It didn't matter that the bonds quickly collapsed, that the company lost a new client or that the money manager who bought the bonds lost his job. Mr. Lewis performed nobly for Salomon Brothers.
But Mr. Lewis soon learned a valuable lesson. The only way to keep his clients - and perhaps assuage his growing feelings of guilt - was to protect them. So with an anxious junk bond trader standing over him and pressuring him to sell a new issue of bonds that everyone knew would go bad, Mr. Lewis cryptically told a grateful client not to touch them with a 10-foot pole.
The book's title, ''Liar's Poker,'' refers to an after-hours game played by Salomon's bond traders and arbitrageurs. The stakes can run as high as several hundred dollars a bet. The game, combining bluff and calculation, is based on guessing the serial numbers of dollar bills. In fact, Mr. Lewis notes, a good player combines all the skills of a good trader. One day, according to Mr. Lewis (Salomon Brothers has denied this story), Mr. Gutfreund walked into the New York trading room and challenged Salomon's top trader to bet $1 million on a single game. But the trader was better than Mr. Gutfreund at this: ''No, John,'' he said. ''I'd rather play for real money. Ten million dollars. No tears.'' Mr. Gutfreund declined, outbluffed before the game began.
Ultimately, Mr. Gutfreund and Salomon Brothers may have outbluffed themselves. With no real long-term game plan, no grasp of overhead and a tendency to live for the next deal, the company had vastly overspent and overexpanded before the 1987 market collapse. Afterward, it was forced to make major personnel cuts and to eliminate whole departments. Its huge expenditures for growth in Europe were unhinged by a number of major miscalculations. Not the least of these, according to Mr. Lewis, was that while many American institutional clients believed they had no choice but to deal with the company, European customers regarded Salomon Brothers as not only crass, but just one of hundreds of brokers. They were not as willing as the Americans to forgive or forget.
Yet the author believes Salomon will survive and prosper. As for Mr. Lewis, having survived the company's staff cuts because of his moneymaking ability, he says that he left Salomon Brothers not out of disillusionment but ''more because I didn't need to stay any longer.'' Whatever the case, he's obviously as good a writer as he was a bond salesman. Perhaps that's because both jobs involve being able to tell a good story.

Michael Lewis in 1989 Explains the Culture at Salomon

“The trading floor is a jungle and the guy you end up working
for is the jungle leader; whether you succeed here or not depends on knowing how to survive in the
jungle,” said one of the leading bond salesman. Some of the other lessons Lewis learned during the training were:

• The market always has a fool. If you can’t see one, it’s probably you.
• You work for Salomon, not the customer, so blowing up the customer is understandable.
• You don’t get ahead by being nice, you get ahead by making money

Duke Bill October Usage -- Laurel

More on Subprimes and Countrywide-type Scams

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/06/business/06mortgage.html?_r=1&oref=slogin


Click on title.

Predicting Natural Gas This Winter

Same issue every year: what to expect. Although gasoline costs are soaring, I do not believe natural gas will soar. There is plenty of natural gas in storage. Plus I believe there is a lot more LNG on line for this winter. I have not checked the February futures, which I use as a proxy for the upcoming winter. Duke files the last day or so of each month setting their rate for the coming month. So that gives no indication of what the winter cost will be. And November price is for bills received in November, so that's already historic usage -- i.e. October, in my case.

I have now checked as of the NYMEX close yesterday. $8.45 per mcf (converts to 84.5
cents per 100 cu ft). Add about 25 cents for Duke's distribution cost and we get about 110 cents, or $1.10 per ccf.

Seems incredibly low in light of the huge rise in oil prices to near $100/bbl, but that appears to be the case. Natural gas over propane, that's for sure too.

OK, take one victorian house. Figure on average 300 ccf per month over the five winter months starting November 1 and ending March 31. 1500 ccf x $1.10. Then for electric add 1500 kwh per month at $.10 per kwh (guessing at the moment) which adds an additional $150/month. You do the math for your house. $480 per month predicted, or $2400 for the heating season.

Of course that's for heating and electrifying a 3300 square foot house.

Duke Bill October Usage -- Greenville; Free Power This Month

Note the Power Manager Install Credit. I called Duke, and this is a program we signed up for earlier in 2007. Because of "curtailments" of our three air conditioning units during the summer period (when the peak hours occurred). a few times, we got a $35 credit for each air conditioner. Since this house did not have air conditioning on during the summer, we got a "free" credit.

Clarence Thomas

From the NYT Book Review of his recent book. Click on "Clarence Thomas" Label and scroll down.

Clarence Thomas

Click on "Clarence Thomas" below and then read the Rolling Stones Article in full.

Photo by my daughter, Genevieve Abel, this weekend from Gudauri, Georgia (former Soviet Union) way up in the Caucasus near a ski resort being built.

April Was the Cruelest Month -- Last Year

"April" showing up on my "May" Duke Energy bill, was a very cold month...for me! But the National Weather Service doesn't show this for the calendar month of April. Why is there a difference?

For me my natural gas bill was very high in "April" for neighborhood of the the two houses I am comparing -- two blocks away from each other. One Victorial wood frame. The other Brick Ranch.

But my meter is not read on the 1st. It is read on the 5th or so of March, the 5th or so of April, and the 5th or so of May. So my "April" is not exactly April first through April 30. It so happens that early in one of these months (April or May) we had some abnormally warm day -- but then cold weather returned with a vengence. Or maybe it was that we had some abnormally cold usage but then warm weather returned with a vengence.

My "Billing April" (date bill is posted by Duke Energy) was March 5th through April 5th. My "Billing May" was April 5th through May 5th.

More later when I check my historic use which is also earlier on this blog.

Merrill Lynch, Michael Lewis, etc.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119396956371280131.html?mod=yahoo_hs&ru=yahoo

click on title.

Thoughts on yesterday's Wall Street news and reportage:

No one mentions this but Michael Lewis, in "Liar's Poker," some 20 years' (?) ago explained why Salomon Brothers' and Lou Ranieri's securitization of mortgages was inheritly impossible of valuation: no one knew when the homeowner would sell his property and pay off the mortgage.

There was a Mallon interview yesterday on CNBC. He justified the subprime mess by saying,

No. 1: it generated a lot of fees;
No. 2: it helped a lot of people buy houses.

Item No. 1 is like the doctor saying to the patient: You have cancer but all is not bad: see that beautiful nurse over there? I'm dating that beautiful nurse over there!

More on Bear Stearns and Duplicate Bridge

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119387369474078336.html?mod=home_whats_news_us

click on title.