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By PAUL KRIESBERG; PAUL KREISBERG, A SENIOR ASSOCIATE AT THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE IN WASHINGTON, WRITES ON AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA.

Published: April 2, 1989

LEAD: IN OUR IMAGE America's Empire in the Philippines. By Stanley Karnow. Illustrated. 494 pp. New York: Random House. $24.95.
IN OUR IMAGE America's Empire in the Philippines. By Stanley Karnow. Illustrated. 494 pp. New York: Random House. $24.95.

In her Independence Day speech in June 1988, Corazon Aquino, the President of the Philippines, proclaimed that ''the long-delayed task'' of achieving a ''genuinely independent Filipino nation,'' possessed of ''true nationalism,'' must be completed by 1998, the 100th anniversary of Emilio Aguinaldo's declaration of Philippine independence from Spain. This would require, she said, the growth of national power, a capacity to control the country's fate in the world and ''respect as an equal by any foreign power that seeks its friendship and cooperation, or dares its enmity.'' She did not spell it out, but what she meant more than anything else was that the Philippines had to come to grips with its relationship with the United States.
Stanley Karnow's panoramic survey brilliantly describes the relations over more than three centuries between the Filipinos and, first, the Spaniards, then the Americans, and finally among themselves in governing the islands. He has written a readable political and social history, filled with vivid portraits of Spanish colonial grandees; American Civil War soldiers and Indian fighters; charismatic, macho, often able but corrupt politicians who dominated Philippine politics; and Americans who were fascinated by the people and the country's beauty.
Good as the book is as history, however, it is somewhat disappointing as a marker for the future of United States-Philippine interactions, which the author concludes will in some way preserve a special relationship between Manila and Washington. But he offers no explanation of how President Aquino's search for ''real nationalism'' may mesh with America's efforts to work through its own changing associations, not just with the Philippines, but also with the richer, more independent and increasingly assertive Asian nations. Nevertheless, there is no other book even approaching Mr. Karnow's either in recounting with sensitivity and accuracy the long history of the Philippines or in leaving readers enormously satisfied with the tale.
''In Our Image'' does not focus on what Mr. Karnow describes as the ''profligacy, corruption and repression'' of Ferdinand Marcos and the rise of Mrs. Aquino. In three clear and anecdote-filled chapters, Mr. Karnow covers this drama, although, writing after so many others, it is not surprising that he adds relatively little new to the story. Still, he sharply describes the indecision in Washington over how American interests would best be served; the tensions that steadily grew among different factions in Manila both before and after the 1983 assassination of Mr. Marcos's archrival, Benigno (Ninoy) Aquino; and the continuing efforts by Filipinos of every political persuasion to influence or assess American preferences. Particularly evocative is a comment Mr. Marcos made to the author that conveys the former President's self-deception and his sense of the power of the United States: ''I didn't realize that the U.S. government was going to intervene and that massive black propaganda and conspiracy by the American press would defame and libel me. Had I been alert, I would not have fallen into the trap. But it was my doing, and I accept the blame.''
Ferdinand Magellan in 1521 was the first European to set foot in the Philippines, and in 60 years Spain completed its conquest of the islands. For the next three and a half centuries the Spaniards ruled, Mr. Karnow shows, with little concern for the development or welfare of the inhabitants, but the conquerers set the pattern for the regionalism and resistance to central direction that bedevil Philippine politics to this day.
Intermarriage among Filipinos, Spaniards and, later, Chinese immigrants established a network of landholding families whose wealth from hemp, copra and sugar enabled them to dominate Philippine business and political life for nearly two centuries. By the mid-1800's a new generation of European-educated Filipinos challenged Spanish rule. But, Mr. Karnow observes, they ''soon discovered that a new and stronger power had come to supplant their decrepit Spanish masters.'' By sheer chance, the Philippine revolt against Spain clashed with the rise of the imperialist age in the United States in the 1890's.
President William McKinley did not even know where the islands were until Adm. George Dewey effortlessly destroyed the antique Spanish fleet in Manila Bay in 1898, leaving the United States faced with a decision whether to hold the Philippines or not. There were strong voices in Congress and among the public, Mr. Karnow makes clear, who did not want the expense, the responsibility, the glory or the racial ''pollution'' of imperial dominion, this last an argument that was also used, Mr. Karnow notes, to avoid absorbing Cuba.
Racial feelings were strong among both proponents and opponents of the American presence in the Philippines. Senator Benjamin (Pitchfork Ben) Tillman of South Carolina protested that retention of the Philippines would inject the blood of that ''debased and ignorant people'' into the ''body politic of the United States.'' Even those who wanted to keep the islands argued in the racist tones of the time. Rudyard Kipling's challenge to Washington to assume the white man's burden carried weight, as did American obligations to our ''little brown brothers,'' in the phrase of the then soon-to-be-President William Howard Taft.
Ultimately the lure of trade, concern that another power would seize the islands and, as Mr. Karnow quotes President McKinley as saying, ''the unexpected'' - a clash between American and Philippine soldiers -tipped the balance toward Senate approval in February 1899 of the treaty with Spain that put the islands under American administration for the next 47 years.
Philippine resistance was overcome in a bloody war that lasted until 1902. Eventually, three-quarters of the United States Army - 75,000 troops - was sent to pacify the country, and an estimated 200,000 people were killed. In one of the book's most effective chapters, Mr. Karnow, a former war correspondent in Vietnam and the author of ''Vietnam: A History,'' makes us feel the conflict's intensity by citing the letters and diaries of soldiers on both sides.
Between 1900 and 1940, governing the Philippines was important both as a political step up, and as a political step down, for Americans. Taft served as Governor there before becoming President of the United States in 1909. Admiral Dewey and Douglas MacArthur, 30 years apart, hoped their Philippine records would help carry them to the White House. Gen. Leonard Wood and Paul V. McNutt were shunted off to Manila in the 1920's and 1930's respectively to keep them out of the running for President. Henry Stimson, the Governor of the islands in 1927 and 1928, became President Herbert Hoover's Secretary of State and President Franklin Roosevelt's Secretary of War, and Frank Murphy, the Governor from 1933 to 1935, was later elevated to the Supreme Court. In those decades when the Philippines were America's showcase of democracy in Asia, the United States built schools, encouraged elections and self-administration, promoted economic development and preached ethical values. Mr. Karnow makes it clear that the success of these American programs was roughly in that order.
The years between the world wars were a period of hot political debate in the Philippines over independence and the country's relationship with the United States. Politicians argued both sides of the issue, sometimes at the same time. Mr. Karnow describes Manuel Quezon, who was to become the islands' first President, as denouncing a colleague for warning that ''independence would bring 'economic ruin and desolation,' '' even though he had secretly approved and edited the speech in advance. Filipinos did reproduce an image of America and of American democracy. But while Philippine democracy looked American, Mr. Karnow underscores just how intensely Philippine it really was, relying heavily on clan and family ties, loyalty, local influence, wealth and much strong-arming. When commonwealth status was granted by the United States in 1935 (with full independence to come in 10 years), the result, Mr. Karnow suggests, was the kind of ''dependent independence'' that many Philippine politicians still see as ideal.
Filipinos fought gallantly in World War II, although many collaborated with the Japanese, arguing that one colonial master was much the same as another. Mr. Karnow observes that after the war American attention to the Philippines became increasingly sporadic, ranging from ''benign neglect to moments of intense concern.'' In reality, it appears that even those moments of concern related far more to our interests elsewhere in the world than to the welfare of the Philippines. And, according to Mr. Karnow, Philippine politicians were bitter. Close bargaining by the United States over reconstruction assistance, trade privileges and military bases seemed little reward for Philippine loyalty and suffering. Philippine ''moral fiber . . . had unravelled during the Japanese occupation,'' Mr. Karnow writes, and implies that this became a pattern from which Philippine political and economic life has yet to, and perhaps cannot, escape. It is not surprising that some Americans were cynical about the lack of development shown for the $2 billion in aid the United States gave the Philippines between 1945 and 1950.
Washington's postwar interest in the Philippines increasingly centered on the contribution to its global interests made by the bases at Subic Bay and Clark Field, which are leased until 1991. Filipinos saw themselves as being used by America, and resentment grew.
Although Filipinos swiftly volunteered to fight with the United States in the Korean War, Mr. Karnow describes how, 15 years later, President Ferdinand Marcos, seeking ''to extract a maximum benefit from a minimal investment,'' had to be cajoled and bribed to provide any help in Vietnam. Mr. Marcos began to look for more ways to distinguish his policies from those of the United States, visiting Moscow, wooing the Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi, but never going too far.
Mr. Karnow describes Mr. Marcos as a ''complex, brilliant, cunning yet essentially cautious man.'' He indirectly compares him to the traditional hero of Philippine politics, Manuel Quezon, who had insisted on the enormous presidential powers and the right to impose martial law that Mr. Marcos later used in 1972. The author takes note of Mr. Marcos's boldness, mastery of the Philippine political system and shrewd foresight in dealing with Americans, particularly President Ronald Reagan, Nancy Reagan and Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey. Mr. Karnow argues that it was not Mr. Marcos's betrayal of democracy that led to his fall but ''his flagrant mismanagement and venality [ that ] bankrupted the country [ and alienated ] the Manila business community and the Catholic hierarchy.'' It is a cynical but justified judgment of Philippine democracy and the lack of American success in transmitting democratic values to the islands.
Mr. Karnow's discussion of the postwar United States-Philippine relationship centers on the occasions when, although the Philippines were independent, America continued to play a key role in the country's politics - to defeat the Huk guerrilla uprising in the early 50's, to elect President Ramon Magsaysay in 1953 and President Diosdado Macapagal in 1961, and to help whisk Mr. Marcos out in 1986. Philippine solicitation of such meddling has also remained part of the political landscape, and most Filipinos still believe that a not-so-invisible American hand is always at work in Philippine politics, whether this is true or not. Some Filipinos see this as reassuring; others as a pervasive intrusion on Philippine independence.
There has been speculation that most of the Philippine Cabinet, a large number of senior military officers and many prominent businessmen maintain residence or citizenship status in the United States, as well as in the Philippines. Even if the numbers are smaller, the phenomenon is still common. Mr. Karnow does not touch on this subject or tell us much about the potential or actual political importance of the million or so Filipinos who have migrated to America and who help support perhaps a quarter of the Philippine population.
He concludes that Filipinos must continue to have American support to resolve their current problems, but he does not say what kind of support or for how long. Would the closing, or a major reduction in the size, of American military bases in the next decade change how the countries act toward each other? How long will the United States be willing to offer $480 million a year in military and economic aid, with the numbers likely to rise steadily during the 1990's? Do enough Americans feel strongly about continuing such spending?
At the end of the book, Mr. Karnow observes that the two countries' ''common past had ordained both their present and their future.'' Unfortunately, he does not offer much more guidance. Americans responded warmly to Mrs. Aquino, but how deep is their sentiment for her country? How many Americans today even know the Philippines were once a United States dependency? What will happen if Japanese trade and investment in the Philippines surpasses that of the United States -a likely event? How about the attitudes of American investors toward the islands? I wish Mr. Karnow had written on for another dozen pages or so as trenchantly about the prospects for the future as he has about the past. But, more important, ''In Our Image'' is 22-karat gold, and worth the time of anyone interested not just in the Philippines or Asia or how Americans deal with their friends and their dependents, but simply in a terrific read. 'THIS BOOK IS ABOUT AMERICA'
The idea for ''In Our Image'' came to Stanley Karnow during his first reporting tour of Asia in the 1950's. But only after decades as a foreign correspondent, and writing histories of China and Vietnam, did he turn his full attention to the Philippines. He was not prepared for the enormous amount of material. One day, he said, he was at the National Archives in Washington, looking for background on an obscure 1920's scandal. Expecting to find just a few clippings, he was amazed, and appalled, when he was brought cartload after cartload. ''The big surprise to me,'' he said, ''is how much I didn't know. It was daunting.''
Writing the book was not any easier. In addition to his research here, he made a half-dozen trips to the Philippines, where theories, facts and gossip often are indistinguishable. ''Everybody is accessible. Everybody talks,'' he said fondly. ''But the problem is you suffer from too much information. And what's important to them is not what's true, but what people think is true.''
Fascinated though he was by it all, he said he wanted to focus on the American role. ''This book,'' he said in a recent telephone interview from his home in Potomac, Md., ''is about America, not about the Philippines.'' From that perspective, Mr. Karnow believes that ''we are bound and ordained to maintain the special relationship,'' rooted in the fact that the Philippines was the United States's only colony. ''The Filipinos look to America,'' he said, ''partly because of their weak national identity. Sometimes I think it's almost a tragedy that they didn't have to struggle more for their independence.''
Mr. Karnow, who has known President Corazon C. Aquino since her days as ''just a housewife,'' attributes her rise to power in large part to United States backing. Although complimentary of her - ''she has a lot of stamina, a strong will'' - he doubts that she wants, or is able, to change the pattern of corrupt and undisciplined Philippine politics: ''Is she going to give a sense of identity to her people? Is she going to get rid of the oligarchies? Is she going to bring prosperity? No.'' LUISITA LOPEZ TORREGROSA
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