Showing posts with label larry summers. Show all posts
Showing posts with label larry summers. Show all posts

Monday, April 6, 2009

Oh Shaw Summers!

[Before you delve into what follows, be sure to click onto the 157 "comments" of this New York Times article of this morning. The thoughtful ones are quite articulate on the delicate nature of the problem we are facing, and exactly who can extract us from the problems, and thus exectly who has the knowledge of what's going on, with trillions in the balance, too.]
"It is a quicksilver business and wildly lucrative."
Between the Hedgies:

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/06/business/06summers.html?hp

From the second page of that article:

[D. E. Shaw] is nothing like a button-down Wall Street brokerage firm. Jeans, sweatshirts and sandals are common. The firm has not one, but two libraries, where textbooks on computer coding are stacked near academic finance journals dating to the 1960s. For a time, the décor included light bulbs strung from the ceiling on
various lengths of wire, each determined by a computerized random-number generator.


========================
Financial disclosure form, released by the White House:
Lawrence E. Summers, director, National Economic Council
Related
Financial Industry Paid Millions to Obama Aide (April 4, 2009)
Times Topics:
Lawrence H. Summers
Readers' Comments
Share your thoughts.
Post a Comment »

===========================

It is a quicksilver business and wildly lucrative. Mr. Shaw is said to be worth $2.7 billion, and today his firm manages $30 billion.


At Shaw, Mr. Summers, the professor, was often the student. The arrogant personal style that turned off some Harvard colleagues seemed to evaporate, Shaw traders say. Mr. Summers immersed himself in dynamic hedging, Libor rates and other financial arcana. He seemed to fit in among Shaw’s math-loving “quants,” as devotees of math-heavy quantitative investing are known. Traders joked that Mr. Summers was the first quant Treasury secretary because he had once ordered dollar bills to
be printed with the transcendental number pi — 3.14159... — as the serial number.


“We could call or e-mail him anytime,” a former Shaw trader said. “He always asked me more questions than I could ask him. He would dig through my entire way of thinking.”At Harvard and at Shaw, Mr. Summers cultivated a small circle of financial professionals — particularly hedge fund managers — to serve as an informal brain trust. He consults with them on policy matters from his perch in the White House. Among these insiders are Kenneth D. Brody and Frank P. Brosens, the foundingpart-ners of another hedge fund, Taconic Capital Advisors, for whom Mr. Summers did consulting work from 2004 to 2006.


Mr. Summers reached out to Mr. Brosens in December to discuss the Obama administration’s economic priorities. This year, he campaigned to have him run
the federal office overseeing the $700 billion bailout program. Mr. Brosens withdrew his name from consideration last month. Others in this inner circle include Nancy Zimmerman, a longtime friend and hedge fund manager in Boston; Laurence
D. Fink
, the chairman and chief executive of BlackRock, a large money management company that hopes to play a potentially lucrative role in the administration’s bank rescue plan; H. Rodgin Cohen, the chairman of the law firm Sullivan & Cromwell, who was briefly considered for a senior Treasury post; and three other top fund managers, Orin S. Kramer, Ralph L. Schlosstein and Eric M. Mindich.


Friends of Mr. Summers say he has always been meticulous about avoiding conflicts of interest and that he was just as careful at D. E. Shaw. For instance, Mr. Summers went to lengths to pay the Social Security taxes on payments he made to even occasional babysitters from the 1980s, said Jeremy Bulow, an economics professor at Stanford, who has known Mr. Summers since graduate school.

“To Larry, it was not about figuring out where the line is and making sure you’re on one side of it,” Mr. Bulow said. “He would never even get close to it.”


In addition to his salary at Shaw, Mr. Summers enjoyed growing wealth through investments in the firm’s funds. Unlike most hedge funds, which lost money as the markets plunged in 2008, Shaw posted returns of about 7 percent in its so-called macroeconomic fund. A separate multistrategy fund lost 8 percent, far less than most hedge funds.
When investors rushed en masse to withdraw their money from hedge funds last year, Shaw asserted its right to block redemptions from its fund. An exception was
made for Mr. Summers, however, because the White House job he was taking required him to divest. A spokesman for Shaw said Mr. Summers’s main job was
not to act as a salesman. But in the fall of 2007, as the financial crisis simmered, Mr. Summers traveled to Dubai for a series of meetings with Shaw’s marketing staff and potential investors. Bankers from across the region flew in for the event. Mr. Summers spoke at several lavish dinners and met with local parties involved in Shaw’s real estate investments in the area, people briefed on his trip said. Last September, Mr. Summers explained to Shaw traders what appeared to be an aberration in a key interest rate, the London interbank offered rate, or Libor, thus helping its traders avoid losses. He spoke at the firm’s 20th anniversary gathering for its investors and at a prominent hedge fund investor conference in Boston, weeks before the presidential election. In December, he attended the firm’s annual holiday party, held in the American Museum of Natural History in New York, beneath the giant model of a blue whale. Even so, Mr. Summers, who, before the crisis broke out, spoke and wrote about the need for greater financial regulation, has not resisted the efforts to tighten up on hedge funds like Shaw. The administration, for instance, is moving toward closing a tax loophole that these funds have long enjoyed. A White House spokeswoman says his actions supporting hedge fund regulation prove he is not biased.


Some people in the financial world say they have more confidence in the White House’s plans because of Mr. Summers’ time at D. E. Shaw. “He had insights into one of the best hedge funds in the world. That can only add value to the things the government is struggling with right now,” said Robert Borden, chief investment officer of South Carolina’s pension fund, which has invested $350 million with Shaw. Mr. Borden met Mr. Summers to discuss how much money a large institution should allocate to hedge funds. “It was a nice perk to have access to some of his thoughts and insights,“ Mr. Borden said.Mr. Summers’s experience in hedge funds might leave some wondering if he will return to private investing when his latest White House assignment ends, perhaps even to run his own lucrative fund. Asked about that, Mr. Shaw laughed. “Oh, boy, I have no idea,” he said. “Thankfully he’s doing what he’s doing. I’m really glad he’s running this. It’s a scary time, and I can’t think of anybody I’d rather see there.”


As readers of this Blog know, I admire and value Larry Summers. But this article goes deeper into his connection with the Shaw Hedge Fund. Does it trouble me? Not really. Larry has his heart in the right place I believe.

What does trouble me is that articles like this make me realize that there are Masters of the Universe out there with black boxes that "see" things that I never could. Moreover they see things that investment advisers cannot see either. Who can compete with them?

And to invest with them requires more money than I have.

But this is off the point as posed implicitly by the New York Times.

Saturday, April 4, 2009

Sunday, March 29, 2009

Saturday, March 21, 2009

Rich and Friedman -- Obama's Katrina; Home Alone

Must read every word. But first listen to the interview with Larry Summers on CBS last Sunday, and the excellent comments of readers/viewers:

http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=4866618n

And before reading Rich, take note of this hugely important blog of Simon Johnson, economist at MIT, who is hitting all the right notes:

http://baselinescenario.com/2009/03/21/ceo-semiotics-and-the-economics-of-vilification/#more-2951

Now Rich's Op Ed piece today:

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/22/opinion/22rich.html?_r=1

And the letter to the editor which keys off Rich's article:



To the Editor:
President Obama may not realize it yet, but his Katrina moment has arrived.
This is a defining moment for his presidency, and how he responds will determine the trajectory of his term. He needs to deal with the excesses within the financial industry with the same toughness and conviction that President Ronald Reagan brought to bear during the air traffic controllers’ strike. To date, he is sorely wanting.
We are not interested in the level of outrage the administration is feeling, but in the effectiveness of its response. So far, it has come across as hapless and completely ineffectual. This Obama voter would like to be spared the speeches and the posturing on the Sunday morning shows — action is what is needed.
Paulette Altmaier, Cupertino, Calif., March 17, 2009
And Rich's article six weeks ago, which I did not post, on Tom Daschle's situation which so enraged the American people and forever tarnished Daschle's reputation:
and the excellent comments thereon from other readers/viewers:

Geithner Asking Libby to Re-negotiate Bonus Contracts: Geithner "Mr Libby, uh, please.." Libby "No" Geithner "Please" Libby "No, go away. And get me some more money." Geithner "Ok, sorry for bothering you. How much more money can we give you?"
Posted by themash at 10:32 PM : Mar 21, 2009
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Real non-sense, break their employment contract, fire them, allow them to reapply for the job with a modified contract. I can't believe a move like that would upset our contractual system or throw it off course as Summer's suggests,"contracts aren't abrogated"? It happens all the time.This can be made law easily. Can you think of how many of us would call or write their Congressperson if was submitted for consideration as law.Yes we can say where US Government $$ goes now happens every minute of every day, it's in the laws all the laws. Summer's seems pretty clueless Bob should have taken him to task.There are plenty of well qualified people for this type of work who did not get us into the mess. Boy could we have used Russert here !
Posted by ckiepper at 11:33 PM : Mar 15, 2009
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Are kidding me with this this guy Summers. I would let Larry Summers run the local hardware store in my town. And he has PHD? That must stand for Pizza Hut Diploma. The reason America is in this situation is because we put guys like this in charge of things. I am embarrassed for him to hear him spew this nonsence. What's willy nilly is that he is allowed to go on CBS news and spread this nonsense. Larry, why don't you stop brown nosing and tell the truth, fronting for these crooks. And Bob, get better guests.
Posted by someguyinamerica at 10:48 PM : Mar 15, 2009
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I AM SORRY. I BELEIVE SOMMERS IS WRONG. CONTRACTS SHOULD BE ABROGATED WHEN THEY become a risk to the sytem. Usually intent needs to be proven to show fraud. In this case, it shoud be a new IDEA. Marshall Law for systemic risk contracts...Not bonuses, bets (CDS) without collateral. Too many Trillions. SYSTEMIC REGULATOR. Sommers is not the right guy for it. All the credentials in the world are not enough. We need leadership with GUTS. Marshall Law for the 60 Trillion Global CDS market. COME ON MR President, rise to the occasion. End the deadlock. Time for RULES!!!
Posted by at 9:51 PM : Mar 15, 2009
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Gee, I wonder why AIG got bailout money in the first place.... Could it be that they hold the insurance on the Congressional pension plan????....While our 401K's and pensions are taking a beating our greedy politicians again thought of themselves first...When hell are we gonna get some intestinal fortitude and have another "Tea Party"....
Posted by WOLFMAN0802 at 6:39 PM : Mar 15, 2009
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If I was congress I would put a hold on these bonuses what kind of message does this send to America and worldwide when AIG is making a joke out of Obama and congress everybody as already seen the first 140 billion go in 3 or 4 months This is not AIG money this is americas money in everybodys mine this is not there profit so they have no right to give bonuses out of our money especially ridicolous bonuses banks pretty much make there own rules without regulation with there money so if this is americas money why is congress not making regulations congress is should be the law not banks who ask for another 30 billion after a short period of time it would be long before the world loses faith in our government and starts to pull there money out of the america when there people start demanding them to when AIG makes a joke out of every american
Posted by noskoman at 6:37 PM : Mar 15, 2009
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This crisis will start to get resolved when we understand who caused it and take steps to get them out of the picture. I am referring to Rep. Barney Frank of Massachusetts and Senator Chris Dodd of Connecticut. Through their positions in Congress, they compelled banks to make risky loans and to this day haven't suspended the rules that banks operate under which got us into this mess. They should recuse themselves from any investigation about the financial crisis and not take part in any new legislation until their culpability has been resolved. Then we can move the country forward.
Posted by olevis55 at 6:33 PM : Mar 15, 2009
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I just transferred from a Lifecycle fund which wasn't aggressive enough for me due to losing $40,000 and in my 40s in a 403b plan and now I'm wondering after hearing Mr. Summers, a male chauvinist pig, formerly from Harvard who left due to his views on women and science with degrees which I hold *** laude a B.S. I wonder if I made the right decision. No, Mr. Summers, we in Boston haven't forgotten your views. It's great for Mr. Bernanke to cheerlead for us since I, for one, called my rep who voted against this crazy bank bailout Mr. Stephen Lynch, but it was cancelled out by Mr. Barney Frank. As Mr. Bernake is cheerleading we hear that AIG is giving big bonuses to the tune of hundred's of millions. I work in the state of RI with the second highest unemployment rate, and I find this terribly repulsive. Everyone just about tarred and feathered Mr. Madoff but as far as I'm concerned that's exactly what our bank's are doing. I have chosen not to bank with Bank of America due to the Merril Lynch bonuses. If the banks continue on this destructive path pretty soon none of us will trust them with their money. So far the only CEO of merit I have heard as of late is the President of Citizens of RI who is going to concentrate on customer service and deposits which lately seems to be lacking in all banks.
Posted by Gadgetgirl84 at 6:18 PM : Mar 15, 2009
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It's the Chinese. The Chinese own a lot of AIG's worthless paper and want the U.S. Government to pay them. If we don't pay them, the will take their money out of our country (over a Trillion dollars in treasury's). We're a debtor nation and will have to kiss some a#% from time to time. This is one of those times.
Posted by Blitzer2 at 5:30 PM : Mar 15, 2009
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I am beside myself on this one. In addition the shear stupidity of this, someone forgot to prep Director Summers about how to speak when doing a media interview. He sounded like a bumbling idiot. Apparently they don't have a Public Relations person prepping him and giving him Media Training. I couldn't believe Dir. Summer when he said "It's outrageous but there is nothing we can do about it." You have GOT to be kidding me... You're the freakin Federal Government, for goodness sakes! Do something - anything - - besides throwing up your hands...
Posted by Scubajoy at 4:46 PM : Mar 15, 2009
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Tuesday, March 17, 2009

AIG Bonuses and the Comments Thereon

They were British; only they know how to unwind the derivatives; they have the leverage:

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/business/17bailout.html

And the following editorial is plain vanilla but essential to read:

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/opinion/17tue1.html?_r=1

But Andrew Ross Serkin says it best!


They built these bombs and are the only ones who know how to defuse it! If they leave the firm they will trade against AIG's book and destroy the system that way!


Dealbook
The Case for Paying Out Bonuses at A.I.G.

comments
By ANDREW ROSS SORKIN
Published: March 16, 2009
Do we really have to foot the bill for those bonuses at the American International Group?
Post a Comment »

It sure does sting. A staggering $165 million — for employees of a company that nearly took down the financial system. And heck, we, the taxpayers, own nearly 80 percent of A.I.G.
It doesn’t seem fair.
So here is a sobering thought: Maybe we have to swallow hard and pay up, partly for our own good. I can hear the howls already, so let me explain.

Everyone from President Obama down seems outraged by this. The president suggested on Monday that we just tear up those bonus contracts. He told the Treasury secretary, Timothy F. Geithner, to use every legal means to recoup taxpayers’ money. Hard to argue there.
“This isn’t just a matter of dollars and cents,” he said. “It’s about our fundamental values.”

On that last issue, lawyers, Wall Street types and compensation consultants agree with the president. But from their point of view, the “fundamental value” in question here is the sanctity of contracts.

That may strike many people as a bit of convenient legalese, but maybe there is something to it. If you think this economy is a mess now, imagine what it would look like if the business community started to worry that the government would start abrogating contracts left and right.

As much as we might want to void those A.I.G. pay contracts, Pearl Meyer, a compensation consultant at Steven Hall & Partners, says it would put American business on a worse slippery slope than it already is. Business agreements of other companies that have taken taxpayer money might fall into question. Even companies that have not turned to Washington might seize the opportunity to break inconvenient contracts.

If government officials were to break the contracts, they would be “breaking a bond,” Ms. Meyer says. “They are raising a whole new question about the trust and commitment organizations have to their employees.” (The auto industry unions are facing a similar issue — but the big difference is that there is a negotiation; no one is unilaterally tearing up contracts.)

But what about the commitment to taxpayers? Here is the second, perhaps more sobering thought: A.I.G. built this bomb, and it may be the only outfit that really knows how to defuse it.
A.I.G. employees concocted complex derivatives that then wormed their way through the global financial system. If they leave — the buzz on Wall Street is that some have, and more are ready to — they might simply turn around and trade against A.I.G.’s book. Why not? They know how bad it is. They built it.
So as unpalatable as it seems, taxpayers need to keep some of these brainiacs in their seats, if only to prevent them from turning against the company. In the end, we may actually be better off if they can figure out how to unwind these tricky investments.
Not that any of this takes the bite out of paying these bonuses. For better or worse — in this case, worse — someone at A.I.G. decided this company needed to sign bonus agreements last year to keep people before the full extent of its problems became clear.
Now we can debate why A.I.G. felt it necessary to guarantee seven executives at least $3 million apiece when the economy was clearly on shaky ground. Perhaps we will find out these contracts were a bit of sleight of hand to enrich executives who knew this financial Titanic had hit the iceberg. But another possible explanation is that A.I.G. knew it needed to keep its people.
That is the explanation offered by Edward M. Liddy, who was installed as A.I.G.’s chief executive when the government effectively nationalized the company last fall. (He is being paid $1 a year.)
“We cannot attract and retain the best and brightest talent to lead and staff” the company “if employees believe that their compensation is subject to continued and arbitrary adjustment by the U.S. Treasury,” he said.
There’s some truth to what Mr. Liddy is saying. Would you want to work at A.I.G.? Sure, maybe for $3 million. But not if you could go somewhere else for even more — or even much less.
“The jobs are terrible,” said Robert M. Sedgwick, an executive compensation lawyer at Morrison Cohen who represents a number of employees of banks that have taken government money. “You have to read about yourself in the paper every day. These people are leaving as soon as they can.”
Let them leave, you say. Where would they go, given the troubles in the financial industry? But the fact is, the real moneymakers in finance always have a place to go. You can bet that someone would scoop up the talent from A.I.G. and, quite possibly, put it to work — against taxpayers’ interests.
“The word on the street is that A.I.G. employees are being heavily recruited,” Ms. Meyer says.
Of course, if taxpayers had not bailed out A.I.G., these contracts would not be worth anything. Andrew M. Cuomo, the attorney general of New York, made the point on Monday, when he subpoenaed A.I.G. for the names of the people who received the bonuses. If A.I.G. had spiraled into bankruptcy, its employees would have had to get in line with other unsecured creditors.
Mr. Cuomo wants to know who A.I.G.’s lucky employees are, and how they have been doing at their jobs. So here is a suggestion for him. Get the list, and give those big earners at A.I.G. a not-so-subtle nudge: Perhaps they will “volunteer” to give some of their bonuses back or watch their names hit the newspapers. But in the meantime, despite how offensive and painful it might be, let’s honor the contracts.

Thank you Andrew Ross Serkin. This article is why you are a separate category on my blog.



Thursday, October 9, 2008

Greenspan Did It: Rubin and Summers "Pantsed"

Fodder for McCain (but dangerous too, as the Republicans were the deregulation poster-boys):

Oh oh, this destroys my decades-old admiration for Rubin. And now he and Summers are the main advisers to Obama, which, until this article, I thought was just perfect.

The hero of this story (see page three of article): Brooksley E. Born
http://www.arnoldporter.com/attorneys.cfm?u=BornBrooksleyE&action=view&id=557


The Reckoning
Taking Hard New Look at a Greenspan Legacy
new_york_times:http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/09/business/economy/09greenspan.html

By PETER S. GOODMAN
Published: October 8, 2008

“Not only have individual financial institutions become less vulnerable to shocks from underlying risk factors, but also the financial system as a whole has become more resilient.” — Alan Greenspan in 2004
George Soros, the prominent financier, avoids using the financial contracts known as derivatives “because we don’t really understand how they work.” Felix G. Rohatyn, the investment banker who saved New York from financial catastrophe in the 1970s, described derivatives as potential “hydrogen bombs.”

And Warren E. Buffett presciently observed five years ago that derivatives were “financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal.”

One prominent financial figure, however, has long thought otherwise. And his views held the greatest sway in debates about the regulation and use of derivatives — exotic contracts that promised to protect investors from losses, thereby stimulating riskier practices that led to the financial crisis. For more than a decade, the former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has fiercely objected whenever derivatives have come under scrutiny in Congress or on Wall Street. “What we have found over the years in the marketplace is that derivatives have been an extraordinarily useful vehicle to transfer risk from those who shouldn’t be taking it to those who are willing to and are capable of doing so,” Mr. Greenspan told the Senate Banking Committee in 2003. “We think it would be a mistake” to more deeply regulate the contracts, he added.

Today, with the world caught in an economic tempest that Mr. Greenspan recently described as “the type of wrenching financial crisis that comes along only once in a century,” his faith in derivatives remains unshaken.
The problem is not that the contracts failed, he says. Rather, the people using them got greedy. A lack of integrity spawned the crisis, he argued in a speech a week ago at Georgetown University, intimating that those peddling derivatives were not as reliable as “the pharmacist who fills the prescription ordered by our physician.”

But others hold a starkly different view of how global markets unwound, and the role that Mr. Greenspan played in setting up this unrest.
“Clearly, derivatives are a centerpiece of the crisis, and he was the leading proponent of the deregulation of derivatives,” said Frank Partnoy, a law professor at the University of San Diego and an expert on financial regulation.

The derivatives market is $531 trillion, up from $106 trillion in 2002 and a relative pittance just two decades ago. Theoretically intended to limit risk and ward off financial problems, the contracts instead have stoked uncertainty and actually spread risk amid doubts about how companies value them.

If Mr. Greenspan had acted differently during his tenure as Federal Reserve chairman from 1987 to 2006, many economists say, the current crisis might have been averted or muted.

Over the years, Mr. Greenspan helped enable an ambitious American experiment in letting market forces run free. Now, the nation is confronting the consequences.

Derivatives were created to soften — or in the argot of Wall Street, “hedge” — investment losses. For example, some of the contracts protect debt holders against losses on mortgage securities. (Their name comes from the fact that their value “derives” from underlying assets like stocks, bonds and commodities.) Many individuals own a common derivative: the insurance contract on their homes.

On a grander scale, such contracts allow financial services firms and corporations to take more complex risks that they might otherwise avoid — for example, issuing more mortgages or corporate debt. And the contracts can be traded, further limiting risk but also increasing the number of parties exposed if problems occur.

Throughout the 1990s, some argued that derivatives had become so vast, intertwined and inscrutable that they required federal oversight to protect the financial system. In meetings with federal officials, celebrated appearances on Capitol Hill and heavily attended speeches, Mr. Greenspan banked on the good will of Wall Street to self-regulate as he fended off restrictions.

Ever since housing began to collapse, Mr. Greenspan’s record has been up for revision. Economists from across the ideological spectrum have criticized his decision to let the nation’s real estate market continue to boom with cheap credit, courtesy of low interest rates, rather than snuffing out price increases with higher rates. Others have criticized Mr. Greenspan for not disciplining institutions that lent indiscriminately.

But whatever history ends up saying about those decisions, Mr. Greenspan’s legacy may ultimately rest on a more deeply embedded and much less scrutinized phenomenon: the spectacular boom and calamitous bust in derivatives trading.

Faith in the System
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Past Coverage
Greenspan Discusses Risks of Derivatives (May 9, 2003)
Greenspan, Unlike Buffett, Sees Derivatives as Positive Influence (March 8, 2003)
Greenspan Questions Some Implicit U.S. Subsidies (April 23, 2002)
Greenspan Urges Congress To Fuel Growth of Derivatives (February 11, 2000)
Related Searches

Greenspan, Alan Get E-Mail Alerts
Derivatives (Financial Transactions) Get E-Mail Alerts
Subprime Mortgage Crisis Get E-Mail Alerts
Regulation and Deregulation of Industry Get E-Mail Alerts

Monday, September 8, 2008

Obama Ought to Say What Summers Just Said

“Today’s necessary but likely very expensive action for taxpayers is the consequence of regulatory neglect and of a broader political system’s reluctance to take on what should have been clearly seen as festering problems,” said Lawrence H. Summers, who as Treasury secretary under President Bill Clinton had warned of mounting problems at the companies."

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